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Lessons from the 2023 Banja Luka Attack
When we think about disinformation and misinformation, our thoughts usually go to rigged elections, and other high-level political matters that alter decision-making processes. However, in practice, false information is more likely to affect the daily lives of the most vulnerable members of society – marginalized groups. In this article, we will explore the case of the attack on LGBT activists in Banja Luka, Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was a direct result of polarizing public and political rhetoric based on misinformation and hate speech. It perfectly illustrates how words can easily translate into real harm when left unchecked.
In March 2023, a group LGBTI rights activists planned a LGBT-themed film screening and discussion in Banja Luka, the capital of Republika Srpska. It was planned as a private, cultural event with a set group of verified participants. The location was known only to the organizers, participants and local authorities. On very short notice, the event was banned by local law enforcement, officially citing security concerns. Meanwhile, the fifteen organizers had already gathered at the venue where the event should have taken place. Shortly before the escalation, police visited the site and reportedly informed the group that they could not guarantee their safety and advised them to leave the city. Within minutes of police withdrawal, a group of about thirty masked individuals approached the venue and attacked the activists. The attack was organised, rapid, and resulted in multiple injured people. Most were fortunately able to get away safely, but still bear mental scars of the event.
The violence did not occur in isolation. It followed a sequence of institutional restriction, public targeting, and a highly polarized environment in which the event itself had already been framed as controversial and unwanted.
Understanding why these events unfolded requires acknowledging the political context of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, which incorporates the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the country was divided into two entities—the Republika Srpska, with a predominantly Serb population, and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, inhabited mainly by Bosniaks and Croats—as well as the Brčko District as an ‘ethnically neutral territory’. This constitutional arrangement, shaped more by the legacy of ethnic cleansing than by demographic realities, continues to define political decision-making through deeply entrenched ethno-national divisions. Republika Srpska has long been dominated by Milorad Dodik, one of the country’s most influential political figures since the end of the war. Having entered politics as a comparatively moderate leader, he gradually adopted increasingly nationalist and authoritarian positions. His political trajectory culminated in his removal from political office by the High Representative, the institution established under the Dayton Peace Agreement to oversee implementation of the peace settlement and safeguard the constitutional order. Furthermore, he was one of the most prominent opposers of the event taking place.
Local media and politicians were quite vocal about their displeasure about the, framing this cultural event, as an attack against traditional values, or how it’s usually presented in the Balkans, “family values”. The most prominent opposers were Dodik, president of RS at the time, and Banja Luka Mayor Draško Stanivuković. Their statements consistently involved misinformation about the event, its participants, and their intentions. As every issue does in the Balkans, especially in BiH, the hate speech had ethno-nationalist elements as well, where Dodik at one point explicitly blamed muslims from the Federation for bringing these new ideologies. The group received numerous threats, anti-LGBT messages were highly visible both in the city’s physical and digital space. This discursive environment did not directly instruct violence, however it did create a permissive atmosphere in which exclusion and hostility were socially legitimized and institutionally tolerated.
Different actors responded in varied ways. Civil society organisations documented the attack and sought international attention, while journalists played a key role in reporting the events despite being amongst the targeted activists. International actors, including the EU and foreign embassies, strongly condemned the violence and highlighted the role of hate speech in enabling such incidents. However, domestic institutional responses remained limited, particularly in terms of accountability and public counter-narratives. Only a few months ago, three years after the attack, Dodik finally was penalized before the law for his hate speech and discrimination. As for the attackers, there is a lack of information available about the proceedings, at least for the time being.
This case illustrates how disinformation and polarization operate not only through false information, but through framing mechanisms that reshape what is seen as legitimate in public space. First, it shows a weakening of institutional trust. When police cancel an event due to security concerns and violence occurs shortly after, citizens are left questioning whether institutions are protecting rights equally or selectively, and the institutional withdrawal becomes as damaging as the violence itself. Second, it deepens social polarization. LGBT rights become a symbolic battlefield for broader identity politics, often framed as a clash between “traditional values” and “Western/Eastern influence.” This binary framing reduces space for democratic dialogue and normalizes exclusion. Third, it has a chilling effect on civil society. Activists reported fear, reduced mobility, and in some cases relocation after the attack. Civil society organisations face increasing pressure to operate within constrained geographic and political spaces, particularly outside Sarajevo.
From a broader regional perspective, this case reflects a structural vulnerability across the Western Balkans: the use of disinformation and moral framing to delegitimize civil society and media, combined with weak enforcement of protection mechanisms for marginalised groups. Similar patterns appear in other contexts where “foreign influence” narratives and cultural, ethnic, nationalist identity politics are used to justify restrictions on rights-based actors. Democratic resilience cannot be understood only through formal institutions. It depends equally on whether rights are socially legitimized and defended in practice. When disinformation shapes public perception to the point where rights are seen as threats, institutions often respond with withdrawal rather than protection.
